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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recognizes that one of the 
greatest technical challenges to the implementation of the new Basel II 
Accord lies on the validation of the banks’ internal credit rating models 
(CRMs). This study investigates new proposals of statistical tests for 
validating the PDs (probabilities of default) of CRMs. It distinguishes 
between proposals aimed at checking calibration and those focused at 
discriminatory power. The proposed tests recognize the existence of default 
correlation, deal jointly with the default behaviour of all the ratings and, 
differently to previous literature, control the error of validating incorrect 
CRMs. Power sensitivity analysis and strategies for power improvement are 
discussed, providing insights on the trade-offs and limitations pertained to 
the calibration tests. An alternative goal is proposed for the tests of 
discriminatory power and results of power dominance are shown for them 
with direct practical consequences. Finally, as the proposed tests are 
asymptotic, Monte-Carlo simulations investigate the small sample bias for 
varying scenarios of parameters.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies issues of validation for credit rating models (CRMs). In this 
article, CRMs are defined as a set of risk buckets (ratings) to which borrowers are 
assigned and which indicate the likelihood of default (usually through a measure of 
probability of default – PD) over a fixed time horizon (usually one year). Examples 
include rating models of external credit agencies such as Moody’s and S&P’s and 
banks’ internal credit rating models.  
 
CRMs have had their relevance increased recently as the new Basel II accord 
(BCBS(2004)) allows the PDs of the internal ratings to function as inputs in the 
computation of banks’ regulatory levels of capital
1. Its goal is not only to make 
regulatory capital more risk sensitive, and therefore to diminish the problems of 
regulatory arbitrage, but also to strengthen stability in financial systems through better 
assessment of borrowers’ credit quality.
2 However, the great challenge for Basel II, in 
terms of implementation, lies on the validation of CRMs, particularly on the validation 
of bank estimated rating PDs
3. 
 
In fact, validation of CRMs has been considered a difficult job due to two main 
factors. Firstly, the typically long credit time horizon of one year or so results in few 
observations available for backtesting.
4 This means, for instance, that the 
bank/supervisor will, in most practical situations, have to judge the CRM based solely 
on 5 to 10 (independent) observations available at the database
5. Secondly, as borrowers 
are usually sensitive to a common set of factors in the economy (e.g. industry, 
geographical region), variation of macro-conditions over the forecasting time horizon 
induces correlation among defaults. Both these factors contribute to decreasing the 
power of quantitative methods of validation. 
                                                     
1 The higher the PD, the higher is the regulatory capital. 
2 On top of that, the transparency requirements contained in Basel II can also be seen as an important 
element aimed at enhancing financial stability. 
3 According to BCBS (2005b) validation is above all a bank task, whereas the supervisor’s role should be 
to certificate this validation. 
4 Notice that this problem is not present in the validation of market risk, where the time horizon is 
typically in the order of days. 
5 For statistical standards a small sample.   5 
In light of that picture, BCBS(2005b) perceives validation of CRMs as 
necessarily comprising a whole set of quantitative and qualitative tools rather than a 
single instrument. This study focuses solely, however, on a particular set of quantitative 
tools, namely the statistical tests. Having in mind the aforementioned unavoidable 
difficulties, this paper scientifically examines the validation of CRMs by means of 
general statistical tests, not dependent on the particular technique used in their 
development
6. Furthermore, framework to be developed does not aim at a final 
prescription but at discussing the trade-offs, strategies and limitations involved in the 
validation task from a statistical perspective.  
 
Even restricting to general statistical tests, the judgment of the performance of a 
CRM is a complex issue. It involves mainly the aspects of calibration and 
discriminatory power. Calibration is the ability to forecast accurately the ex-post (long-
run) default rate of each rating (e.g. through an ex-ante estimated PD). Discriminatory 
power is the ability to ex-ante discriminate, based on the rating, between defaulting 
borrowers and non-defaulting borrowers.  
 
As BCBS(2004) is explicit about the demand for banks’ internal models to 
possess good calibration, testing calibration is the starting point of this paper.
7 
According to BCBS(2005b), quantitative techniques for testing calibration are still on 
the early stages of development. BCBS(2005b) reviews some simple tests, namely, the 
Binomial test, the Hosmer-Lemeshow test, a Normal test and the Traffic Lights 
Approach (Blochwitz et. al. (2003)). These techniques have all the disadvantage of 
being univariate (i.e. designed to test a single rating PD per time) or to make the 
unrealistic assumption of cross-sectional default independency
8. Further, they do not 
control for the error of accepting a miscalibrated CRM
9. This paper presents an 
asymptotic framework to jointly test several PDs under the assumption of default 
correlation and controlling the previous error. The approach is close in spirit to 
Balthazar (2004), although here the testing problem formulation is remarkably distinct.  
                                                     
6 This allows the discussions of this paper to assume a general nature. 
7 According to BCBS (2004), PDs should resemble long-run average default rates for all ratings. 
8 Most of them suffer from both problems. 
9 They control for the error of rejecting correct CRMs.   6 
Good discriminatory power is also a desirable property of CRMs as it allows 
rating based yes/no decisions (e.g. credit granting) to be taken with less error and 
therefore less cost by the bank (see Blochlinger and Leippold (2006) for instance). 
BCBS(2005b) comprehensively reviews some well established techniques for 
examining discriminatory power, including the area under the ROC curve (Engelmann 
et. al. (2003)), the Accuracy Ratio and the Kolgomorov-Smirnov statistic.  
 
Although the use of the above mentioned techniques of discriminatory power is 
widespread in banking industry, two constraining points should be noted. First, the 
pursuit of perfect discrimination is inconsistent with the pursuit of perfect calibration in 
realistic CRMs. The reason is that to increase discrimination one would be interested in 
having, over the long run, the ex-post rating distributions of the default and non-default 
groups of borrowers as separate as possible and this involves having default rates as low 
as possible for good-quality ratings (in particular, lower than the PDs of these ratings) 
and as high as possible for bad-quality ratings (in particular, higher than the PDs of 
these ratings). See the appendix A for a graphical example. Second, although not 
remarked in the literature, usual measures of discriminatory power are function of the 
cross-sectional dependency between borrowers. This fact potentially represents an 
undesired property of traditional measures to the extent that the level and structure of 
default correlation is mainly a portfolio characteristic rather than a property intrinsic to 
the performance of CRMs
10. The framework of this paper leads to theoretical tests of 
“discrimination power” that 1) can be seen as a necessary requisite to perfect calibration 
and 2) are not a function of the default dependency structure.  
 
This text is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a default rate asymptotic 
probabilistic model (DRAPM) upon which validation will be discussed. The model 
leads to a unified theoretical framework for checking calibration and discriminatory 
power. Section 3 discusses briefly the formulation of the testing problem for CRM 
validation. The discussion of calibration testing, both one-sided and two-sided, is 
contained in section 4. Theoretical aspects of discriminatory power testing are 
                                                     
10 It is not solely a portfolio characteristic because default correlation among the ratings potentially 
depends on the design of the CRM too.   7 
investigated in section 5. Section 6 contains a Monte–Carlo analysis of the small sample 




2. The default rate asymptotic probabilistic model (DRAPM) 
 
The model of this section provides a default rate probability distribution upon 
which statistical testing is possible. It is based on an extension of the Basel II 
underlying model of capital requirement. In fact, this paper generalizes the idea of 
Balthazar(2004), of using the Basel II model for validation, to a multi-rating setting
11,12. 
The applied extension is based on Demey et. al. (2004)
13 and refers to including an 
additional systemic factor for each rating. While in Basel II the reliance on a single 
factor is crucial to the derivation of portfolio invariant capital requirements (c.f. Gordy 
(2003)), for validation purposes a richer structure is necessary to allow for non-singular 
variance matrix among the ratings, as it becomes clearer ahead in the section. 
 
The formulation of DRAPM starts with a decomposition of zin, the normalized 




½ x + (ρW - ρB)
½ xi + (1- ρW )
½ εin, 
for each rating i=1…I and each borrower n=1..N, where x, xi,  εij (i=1...I, 
j=1…N) are independent and standard normal distributed. 
 
Above, x represents a common systemic factor affecting the asset return of all 
borrowers, xi a systemic factor affecting solely the asset return of borrowers with rating 
i and εin an idiosyncratic shock. The parameters ρB and ρW lie in the interval [0 1]. Note 
                                                     
11 This paper’s approach also differs from Balthazar(2004) in reversing the role of the hypothesis, as 
section 3 explains. 
12 The reader is referred to BCBS(2005a) for a detailed presentation of the Basel II underlying model. 
13 The purpose of Demey et. al. (2004) is to estimate correlations while the focus here is on developing a 
minimal non-degenerate multivariate structure useful for testing.   8 
that Cov(zin,zjm) is equal to ρW if i=j and to ρB otherwise, so that ρW represents the 
“within-rating” asset correlation and ρB the “between-rating” asset correlation.  
 
The model description continues with the statement that a borrower j with rating 
i defaults at the end of the forecasting time horizon if zin < Φ
-1(PDi) at that time, where 
Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Note that the 
probability of this event is therefore, by construction, PDi
14
. Consequently, the 
conditional probability of default PDi(x), where x=(x,x1,…,xI)’ denotes the vector of 
systemic factors, can be expressed by: 
 
PDi(x) ≡ Prob(zin < Φ
-1(PDi)|x) = Φ( (Φ
-1(PDi) - ρB
½ x - (ρW - ρB)
½ xi )/(1- ρW )
½ ) 
 
Let’s focus now on the asymptotic behaviour of the observable default rates. Let 
DRiN denote the default rate computed using a sample of N borrowers with rating i at 
the start of the forecasting horizon. It is easy to see, as in Gordy (2003), that: 
 




-1 is continuous, it is also true that  
Φ
-1(DRiN) – Φ
-1(PDi(x)) → 0 a.s. when N → ∞, 
so that in DRAPM the Φ
-1 transformed default rates have asymptotically the 
same distribution as the Φ





More concretely, the limiting default rate joint distribution is: 
Φ
-1(DR) ≈ N(μ, ∑) 
where DR = (DR1,DR2,…,DRI)
T, μi = Φ
-1(PDi)/(1- ρW )
½ , ∑ij = ρW /(1- ρW) if 
i=j and ∑ij =ρB /(1- ρW) otherwise. 
                                                     
14 Without generalization loss, PDi is assumed to increase in i. 
15 a.s. stands for almost sure convergence. 
16 See the expression for PD(x).   9 
This is the distribution upon which all the tests of this paper will be derived. A 
limiting normal distribution is mathematically convenient to the derivation of likelihood 
ratio multivariate tests. The cost to be paid is that the approach is asymptotic, so that the 
discussions and results of this paper are not suitable for CRMs with a small number of 
borrowers per rating, such for example rating models for large corporate exposures. 
Even for moderate numbers of borrowers, section 6 reveals that the departure from the 
asymptotic limit can be substantial, significantly altering the theoretical size and power 
of the tests. Application of the tests of the next sections should then be extremely 
careful. 
 
Some comments on the choice of the form of ∑ are warranted
18. To the extent 
that borrowers of each rating present similar distributions of economic and geographic 
sectors of activity, that define the default dependency, ρB is likely to be very close to 
ρW, as this situation resembles the one factor case. By its turn, this paper assumes 0 < ρB 
< ρW, in opposition to ρB = ρW, in order to leave open the possibility of some degree of 
association between PDs and borrowers’ sectors of activity and with the technical 
purpose of obtaining a non-singular matrix ∑
19,20. As a result, borrowers in the same 
rating behave more dependently than borrowers in different ratings, possibly because 
the profile of borrowers’ sectors of activity is more homogeneous within than between 
ratings. Indeed, more realistic modelling is likely to require a higher number of asset 
correlation parameters and a portfolio dependent approach; therefore the choice of just a 
pair of correlation parameters is regarded here as a practical compromise for general 
testing purposes.  
 
This paper further assumes that the correlation parameters ρW and ρB are known. 
The typically small number of years that banks have at their disposal suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                                          
17 Although the choice of the normal distribution for the systemic factors may seem arbitrary in Basel II, 
for the testing purposes of this paper it is a pragmatic choice. 
18 Note that the structure of ∑ defines DRAPM more concretely than the chosen decomposition of the 
normalized asset return, because the decomposition is not unique given ∑. 
19 To the best of the author’s knowledge, the empirical literature lacks studies on that association.  
20 Even if the bank or the supervisor is convinced of the appropriateness of ρB = ρW, the approach of this 
paper is still defendable, provided, for instance, the default rates of different ratings are computed 
based on distinct sectors of activity.   10 
inclusion of correlation estimation in the testing procedure is not feasible, as it would 
diminish considerably the power of the tests. Instead, this paper relies on Basel II accord 
to extract some information on correlations
21. By matching the variances of the non-
idiosyncratic parts of the asset returns in Basel II and DRAPM models, ρW can be seen 
as the asset correlation parameter present in the Basel II formula
22. For corporate 
borrowers, for example, Basel II accord chooses ρW ∈ [0.12 0.24]
 23. Sensitivity analysis 
of the power of the tests on the choices of these parameters is carried out in section 4. It 
should be noted, however, that the supervisory authority may have a larger set of 
information to estimate correlations and/or may even desire to set their values publicly 
for testing purposes. 
 
Finally, it is assumed serial independency for the annual default rate time series. 
Therefore, the (Φ
-1 transformed) average annual default rate, used as the test statistic for 
the tests of the next sections, has the normal distribution above, with ∑/Y in place of ∑, 
where Y is the number of years available to backtest. According to BCBS(2005b), serial 
independency is less inadmissible than cross-sectional independency. 
 
 
3. The formulation of the testing problem 
 
Any configuration of a statistical test should start with the definitions of the 
null hypothesis Ho and the alternative one H1. In testing a CRM, a crucial decision 
refers to where the hypothesis “the rating model is correctly specified” should be 
placed?
24 If the bank/supervisor only wishes to abandon this hypothesis if data strongly 
suggests it is false then the “correctly specified” hypothesis should be placed under H0, 
                                                     
21 An important distinction to the Basel II model, however, is that this paper does not make correlations 
dependent on the rating. In fact, the empirical literature on asset correlation estimation contains 
ambiguous results on this sensitivity.  
22 Note that Basel II can also be seen as the particular case of DRAPM when the coefficient of xi is null, 
i.e. when ρB = ρW. 
23 On the other hand, Basel II accord doesn’t provide information on ρB because it is based on a single 
systemic factor. 
24 For this general discussion, one can think of “correctly specified” as meaning either correct calibration 
or good discriminatory power.   11 
as in BCBS (2005b) or in Balthazar (2004)
25. But if the bank/supervisor wants to know 
if the data provided enough evidence confirming the CRM is correctly specified, then 
this hypothesis should be placed in H1 and its opposite in Ho. The reason is that the 
result of a statistical test is reliable knowledge only when the null hypothesis is rejected, 
usually at a low significance level. The latter option is pursued throughout this paper. 
Thus the probability of accepting an incorrect CRM will be the error to be controlled for 
at the significance level α. To the best of the author’s knowledge this paper is the first 
to feature the CRM validation problem in this way. 
 
Placing the “correctly specified” hypothesis under H1  has immediate 
consequences. For a statistical test to make sense H0 usually needs to be defined by a 
closed set and H1, therefore, by an open set
26. This implies that the statement that “the 
CRM is correctly specified” needs to be translated into some statement about the 
parameters PDis lying in an open set, in particular there shouldn’t be equalities defining 
H1 and the inequalities need to be strict. It is, for example, statistically inappropriate to 
try to conclude that the PDis are equal to the bank postulated values. In cases like that 
the solution is to enlarge the desired conclusion by means of the concept of an 
indifference region. The configuration of the indifference region should convey the idea 
that the bank/regulator is satisfied with the eventual conclusion that the true PD vector 
lies there. In the previous case the indifference region could be formed for example by 
open intervals around the postulated PDis. The next sections make use of the concept to 
a great extent. At this point it is desirable only to remark that the feature of an 
indifference region shouldn’t be seen as a disadvantage of the approach of this paper. 
Rather, it reflects better the fact that not necessarily all the borrowers in the same rating 
i have exactly the same theoretical PDi and that it is, therefore, more realistic to see the 
ratings as defined by PD intervals.
27 
                                                     
25 Although they do not remark the consequences of this choice. 
26 H 0 and H0 U H1 need to be closed sets in order to guarantee that the maximum of the likelihood 
function is attained.  
27 However, in the context of Basel II, ratings need not be related to PD intervals but merely to single PD 
values. In light of this study’s approach, this represents a gap of information needed for validation.    12 
4. Calibration testing 
 
This section distinguishes between one-sided and two-sided tests for calibration. 
One-sided tests (which are only concerned about PDis being sufficiently high) are useful 
to the supervisory authority by allowing to conclude that Basel II capital requirements 
derived by the approved PD estimates are sufficiently conservative in light of the banks’ 
realized default rates. From a broader view, however, not only excess of regulatory 
capital is undesirable by banks but also BCBS(2004) states that the PD estimates should 
ideally be consistent with the banks’ managerial activities such as credit granting and 
credit pricing
28. To accomplish these goals, PD estimates must, without adding 
distortions, reflect the likelihood of default of every rating, something to be verified 
more effectively by two-sided tests (which are concerned about PDis being within 
certain ranges). Unfortunately the difficulties present in two-sided calibration testing are 
greater than in one-sided testing, as indicated ahead in the section. The analysis of one-
sided calibration testing starts the section. 
 
4.a. One-sided calibration testing 
 
Based on the arguments of the previous section about the proper roles of Ho and 
H1, the formulation of a one-sided calibration test is proposed below. Note that the 
desired conclusion, configured as an intersection of strict inequalities, is placed in H1.  
 
Ho: PDi ≥ ui for some i =1…I 
H1: PDi < ui for every i=1…I 
where  PDi  ≡  Φ
-1(PDi) , ui  ≡  Φ
-1 (ui). (This convention of representing Φ
-1 
transformed figures in italic is followed throughout the rest of the text)
29. 
 
                                                     
28 More specifically, if the PDs used as inputs to the regulatory capital differ from the PDs used in 
managerial activities, at least some consistency must be verified between the two sets of values for 
validation purposes, c.f. BCBS(2006).  
29 As Φ
-1 is strictly increasing, statements about italic figures imply equivalent statements about non-italic 
figures.   13 
Here ui is a fixed known number that defines an indifference acceptable region 
for PDi. Its value should ideally be slightly larger than the value postulated for PDi so 
that the latter is within the indifference region. Besides, ui should preferably be smaller 
than the value postulated for PDi+1 so that at least the rejection of H0 could conclude that 
PDi < postulated PDi+1.
30,31  
 
According to DRAPM and based on the results of Sasabuchi (1980) and Berger 
(1989), which investigate the problem of testing homogeneous linear inequalities 
concerning normal means, a size α critical region can be derived for the test.
32 
 
Reject H0 (i.e. validate the CRM) if 
i DR ≤ ui /(1- ρW )
½ - zα (ρW /(Y(1- ρW)))











1  is the (transformed) average annual default rate of rating i 
and zα = Φ(1-α) is the 1-α percentile of the standard normal distribution.
33 
 
This test is a particular case of a min test, a general procedure that calls for the 
rejection of a union of individual hypotheses if each one of them is rejected at level α. 
In general the size of a min test will be much smaller than α but the results of Sasabuchi 
(1980) and Berger (1989) guarantee that the size is exactly α for the previous one-sided 
calibration test
34. This means that the CRM is validated at size α if each PDi is validated 
as such.  
 
A min test has several good properties. First, it is uniformly more powerful 
(UMP) among monotone tests (Laska and Meisner (1989)), which gives a solid 
theoretical foundation for the procedure since monotonicity is generally a desired 
                                                     
30 As banks have the capital incentive to postulate lower PDs one could argue that PDi < postulated PDi+1 
also leads to PDi < true PDi+1. 
31 Specific configurations of ui are discussed later in the section. 
32 Size of a test is the maximum probability of rejecting H0 when it is true. 
33 This definition of  i DR  is used throughout the paper.  
34 More formally this is the description of a union-intersection test, of which the min test is a particular 
case when all the individual critical regions are intervals not limited on the same side.    14 
property.
35 Second, as the transformed default rate variables are asymptotically normal 
in DRAPM, the min test is also asymptotically the likelihood ratio test (LRT). Finally, 
the achievement of size α is robust to violation of the assumption of normal copula for 
the transformed default rates (Wang et. al. (1999)) so that, for size purposes, the 
requirement of joint normality for the systemic factors can be relaxed. 
 
From a practical point of view it should be noted that the decision to validate or 
not the CRM does not depend on the parameter ρB, which is useful for applications 
since ρB is not present in Basel II framework and so there is not much knowledge about 
its reasonable values. However, the power of the test, i.e. the probability of validating 
the CRM when it is correctly specified, does depend on ρB. The power is given by the 
expression below. 
 
Power = ΦI(- zα + (u1 – PD1)/ (ρW /Y)
 ½,….,-zα + (ui – PDi)/ (ρW /Y)
 ½ , ….,-zα + (uI – PDI)/ (ρW /Y)
 ½, ρB /ρW ), 
where ΦI(….,ρB /ρW) is the cumulative distribution function of a I
th-variate normal of 
mean 0, variances equal to 1 and covariances equal to ρB/ρW. 
 
Berger (1989) remarks that if the ratio ρB /ρW is small then the power of this test 
can be quite low for the PDis only slightly smaller than uis and/or a large number of 
ratings I. This is intuitive as a low ratio ρB/ρW indicates that ex-post information about 
one rating does not contain much information about other ratings and so is less helpful 
to conclude for validation. On the other hand, as previously noted in section 2, DRAPM 
is more realistic when ρB/ρW  is close to 1 so that the referred theoretical problem 
becomes less relevant in the practical case.  
 
More generally, it is easy to see that the power increases when PDis decrease, uis 
increase, Y increases, I decreases, ρB increases or ρW decreases
36. In fact, it is worth 
examining the trade-off between the configuration of the indifference region in the form 
                                                     
35 In the context of this paper, a test is monotone if the fact that average annual default rates are in the 
critical region implies that smaller average default rates are still in the critical region. Monotonicity is 
further discussed later in the paper. 
36 Obviously the power also increases when the level α increases.   15 
of the uis and the attained power. If high precision is demanded (uis close to postulated 
PDis) then power must be sacrificed; if high power is demanded then precision must be 
sacrificed (uis far from postulated PDis). Some numerical examples are analyzed below 
in order to provide further insights on this trade-off. 
 
The case I=1 represents an upper bound to the power expression above. In this 
case, for a desired power of β when the probability of default is exactly equal to the 
postulated PD, it is true that: 




In a base case scenario given by Y=5, ρW = 0.15, α = 15 % and β = 80 % the 
right hand side of the previous equation is approximately equal to 0.32. This scenario is 
considered here sufficiently conservative with a realistic balance between targets of 
power and size. In this case, it holds that:  
ui = Φ(0.32 + Φ
-1(PDi)) 
 
Table 1 below displays pairs of values of ui and PDi that conform to the equality 
above. 
 
Table 1: ui X PDi. 
PDi(%)  1  2 3 4 5 6  7  8 9 10  11  12  13  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
ui (%)  2  4 6 8 9 11 12 14 15 17 18 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 29 30 
 
 
As, in a multi-rating context, any reasonable choice of ui must satisfy ui ≤ PDi+1, 
table 1 illustrates, for the numbers of the base case scenario, an approximate lower 
bound for  PDi+1 in terms of PDi
37,38. More generally, table 1 provides examples of 
whole rating scales that conform to the restriction PDi+1 ≥ ui, e.g. PD1=1%, PD2=2%, 
PD3=4%, PD4=8%, PD5=14%, PD6=22%, PD7=36%. Note that such conforming rating 
                                                     
37 Approximate because the computation was based on I=1. In fact the true attained power in a multi 
rating setup is smaller. 
38 The discussion of this paragraph assumes true PD = postulated PD.   16 
scales must posses increasing PD differences between consecutive ratings (i.e. PDi+1 - 
PDi increasing in i), a characteristic found indeed in the design of many real-world 
CRMs. Therefore DRAPM suggests a validation argument in favour of that design 
choice. Notice that this feature of increasing PD differences is directly related to the 
non-linearity of Φ, which in turn is a consequence of the asymmetry and kurtosis of the 
distribution of the untransformed default rate. 
 
To further investigate the feature of increasing PD differences and choices of 
u=(u1,u2,…,uI)’ in the one-sided calibration test, the cases I=3 and I=4 are explicitly 
analyzed in the sequence. For each I, four CRMs are considered with their PDis 
depicted in table 2. CRMs of table 2 can have PDis following either an arithmetic 
progression or a geometric progression. Besides, two strategies of configuration of the 
indifference region are considered: a liberal one with ui = PDi+1 and a more precise one 
with ui = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2. In order to allow for a fair comparison of power among 
distinct CRMs, PDis figures of table 2 are chosen with the purpose that the resulting sets 
of ratings of each CRM cover equal ranges in the PD scale. More specifically, this goal 
is interpreted here as all CRMs having equal u0 and uI
39,40.  
 
Table 2: PDs(%) chosen according to ui specification and CRM design 
PDis follow arithmetic progression  PDis follow geometric progression 
 
ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 
I=3  1.22, 11.82, 22.42  6.52, 17.17, 27.72  1.22, 3.66, 11  1.83, 5.5, 16.5 
I=4   2, 9.5, 17, 24.5  5.75, 13.25, 20.75, 28.25  2, 4, 8, 16  2.66, 5.33, 10.66, 21.33 
 
The power figures of the one-sided calibration test at the postulated PDs are 
shown in tables 3 and 4, according to values set to parameters ρW and Y. The values of 
these parameters are chosen considering three feasible scenarios: a favourable one 
characterized by 10 years of data and a low within-rating correlation of 0.12, a 
                                                     
39 u0 corresponds to the fictitious PDo. At table 2, PDo can be easily figured out from the constructional 
logic of the PDi progression. 
40 For the construction of the CRMs of table 2, u0=1.22% and u3=33% for I=3 and u0=2% and u4=32% for 
I=4. Furthermore the ratio of the PDi geometric progression is set equal to 3 for I=3 and to 2 for I=4.   17 
unfavourable one characterized by the minimum number of 5 years prescribed by Basel 
II (c.f.Basel (2004)) and a high ρW at 0.18 and an in-between scenario
41. 
 
Table 3: Power comparison among CRM designs and ui choices, I=3 
ρB/ρW = 0.8, α= 0.15 
PDis follow arithmetic progression  PDis follow geometric progression 
 
ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 
ρW = 0.12, Y=10  0.97 0.57 0.99 0.95 
In-between   0.85  0.42  0.97  0.81 
ρW =0.18, Y=5  0.72 0.33 0.91 0.67 
 
 
Table 4: Power comparison among CRM designs and ui choices, I=4 
ρB/ρW = 0.8, α= 0.15 
PDis follow arithmetic progression  PDis follow geometric progression 
 
ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 ui = PDi+1 u i = (PDi+1 + PDi)/2 
ρW = 0.12, Y=10  0.82 0.39 0.95 0.68 
In-between   0.62  0.28  0.81  0.48 
ρW =0.18, Y=5  0.49 0.22 0.65 0.37 
 
 
Table 3 and 4 show that CRMs with the feature of increasing (PDi+1 - PDi) 
usually achieve significantly higher levels of power than CRMs with equally spaced 
PDis, confirming the intuition derived from table 1. The tables also reveal that, even 
when solely focusing on the former, more demanding requirements for ui (c.f. ui  = 
(PDi+1 + PDi)/2) may produce overly conservative tests, with for example power on the 
level of only 37%. Therefore liberal strategies for ui (c.f. ui  = PDi+1) seem to be 
necessary for realistic validation attempts and attention is focused on these strategies to 
the remainder of this section. Further from the tables, the power is found to be very 
sensitive to the within-rating correlation ρW and to the number of years Y. It can 
increase more than 80% from the worst to the best scenario (c.f. last column of table 4).  
 
                                                     
41 As ρB/ρW is fixed in tables 3 and 4, what matters for the power calculation is just the ratio (ρW/Y). 
Therefore, the in-between scenario can be thought as characterized by adjusting both Y and ρW or just 
one of them. At tables 3 and 4 it is given by (ρW/Y)
 ½ = 0.15.   18 
While in previous tables the between-rating correlation parameter ρB is held 
fixed, tables 5 and 6 examine its effect, along a set of feasible values, on the power of 
the test. Power is computed at the postulated PDs of CRMs of table 2 with ui = PDi+1, 
I=4 and for the in-between scenario of parameters of ρW and Y. The tables show just a 
minor effect of ρB, regardless of the size of the test and the CRM design. Therefore, 
narrowing down the uncertainty in the value of ρB value is not of great importance if 
just approximate levels of power are desired at postulated PDs. The elements that 
indeed drive the power of the test are unveiled in the next analysis.  
 
Table 5: Effect of ρB when PDis follow arithmetic progression 
ui = PDi+1, (ρW/Y)







Table 6: Effect of ρB when PDis follow geometric progression  
ui = PDi+1, (ρW/Y)







Tables 7 and 8 below provide insights on the relative role played by the different 
ratings on the power. Power is computed at postulated PDs for a sequence of four 
embedded CRMs, starting with the CRM with equally spaced PDs of the second line of 
table 7 (the CRM with increasing PD differences of the second line of table 8). Each 
next CRM in table 7 (table 8) is built from its antecedent by dropping the less risky 
(riskiest) rating. Power is computed for the in-between scenario and ui = PDi+1. The 
tables reveal that, as the number of ratings diminishes, the power increases just to a 
minor extent, provided the riskiest (less risky) ratings are always kept in the CRM. Thus 
it can be said that in table 7 (table 8) the highest (lowest) PDis drive the power of the 
test. This is partly intuitive because the highest (lowest) PDis correspond to the smallest 
differences (ui  - PDi) in the CRMs of table 7 (table 8) and because distinct PDis 
  α=5%  α=10%  α=15% 
ρB/ρW = 0.6  0.32 0.47  0.58 
ρB/ρW = 0.7  0.35 0.50  0.60 
ρB/ρW = 0.8  0.38 0.52  0.62 
ρB/ρW = 0.9  0.41 0.55  0.65 
  α=5%  α=10%  α=15% 
ρB/ρW = 0.6  0.54 0.69  0.78 
ρB/ρW = 0.7  0.56 0.71  0.79 
ρB/ρW = 0.8  0.60 0.73  0.81 
ρB/ρW = 0.9  0.62 0.74  0.82   19 
contribute to the power differently just to the degree their differences (ui - PDi) vary
42. 
The surprising part of the result refers to the degree of relative low importance of the 
dropped PDis: the variation of power between I=1 and I=4 can be merely around 10%. 
This latter observation should be seen as a consequence of the functional form of 
DRAPM, particularly the choice of the normal copula for the (transformed) default rates 
and the form of Σ.  
 
Table 7: Influence of distinct PDis on power 
PDis follow arithmetic progression; ρB/ρW = 0.6; (ρW /Y)
 ½ = 0.15; ui = PDi+1 
PDis  α=5%  α=10%  α=15% 
2%, 9.5%, 17%, 24.5%  0.32 0.47  0.58 
9.5%, 17%, 24.5%  0.32  0.47  0.58 
17%, 24.5%  0.34  0.49  0.59 
24.5% 0.44  0.58  0.68 
 
 
Table 8: Influence of distinct PDis on power 
PDis follow geometric progression; ρB/ρW = 0.6; (ρW /Y)
 ½ = 0.15; ui = PDi+1 
PDis  α=5%  α=10%  α=15% 
2%, 4%, 8%, 16%  0.54 0.69  0.78 
2%, 4%, 8%  0.54  0l.69  0.78 
2%, 4%  0.56  0.71  0.79 
2% 0.65  0.77  0.84 
 
A message embedded in the previous tables is that in some quite feasible cases 
(e.g. Y=5 years available at the database, ρW = 0.18 reflecting the portfolio default 
volatility, α < 15% desired) the one-sided calibration test can have substantially low 
power (e.g. lower than 50% at the postulated PD). Another related problem refers to the 
test not being similar on the boundary between the hypotheses and therefore biased (if 
I>1)
43. To cope with these deficiencies, the statistical literature contains some proposals 
                                                     
42 It is easy to see that for the CRMs with equally spaced PDis, (ui – PDi) is trivially constant in i but the 
Φ
-1-transformed difference (ui – PDi) decreases in i. For the CRMs with increasing (PDi+1 – PDi,), (ui – 
PDi) trivially increases in i and the Φ
-1-transformed difference (ui – PDi) increases in i too. 
43 A test is α similar on a set A if the probability of rejection is equal to α everywhere there. A test is 
unbiased at level α if the probability of rejection is smaller than α everywhere in H0 and greater than 
α everywhere in H1. Every unbiased test at level α with a continuous power function is α-similar in 
the boundary between H0 and H1. (Gourieroux & Monfort (1995))   20 
of non-monotone uniformly more powerful tests for the same problem, such as in Liu 
and Berger (1995) and Dermott and Wang (2002). The new tests are constructed by 
carefully enlarging the rejection region in order to preserve the size α. The enlargement 
trivially implies power dominance. The new tests have two main disadvantages though. 
First, from a supervisory standpoint, non-monotone rejection regions are harder to 
defend on an intuitive basis because they imply that a bank could pass from a state of 
validated CRM to a state of non-validated CRM if default rates for some of the ratings 
decrease. Second, from a theoretical point of view, Perlman and Wu (1999) note that 
the new tests do not dominate the original test in the decision theoretic sense because 
the probability of validation under H0 (i.e. when the CRM is incorrect) is also higher for 
them
44. The authors conclude that UMP tests should not be pursued at any cost, 
particularly at the cost of intuition. This is the view adopted in this study so that the new 
tests are not explored further in this paper.  
 
Yet, one may try to include some prior knowledge in the formulation of the one-
sided calibration test as a strategy for power improvement. Notice, first, that the size α 
of the test is attained when all but one of the PDis go to 0 while the remaining one is set 
fixed at ui
45,46. This is probably a very unrealistic scenario against which the bank or the 
supervisor would like to be protected. The bank/supervisor may alternatively remove by 
assumption this unrealistic case from the space of PD possibilities and rather consider 
that part of the information to be tested is true. Notably, it can be assumed that the 
postulated PDi-1, not 0, represents a lower bound for PDi, for every rating i. A natural 
modification of the test consists then on replacing zα by a smaller constant c > 0 to 
adjust to the removed unrealistic PD scenarios
47, with resulting enlargement of the 
critical region and achievement of a more powerful test
48. Hence, c is defined by the 
requirement that the size of the modified test (with c instead of zα) in the reduced PD 
space is α. Similarly to Sasabuchi (1980), the determination of c needs the examination 
                                                     
44 More specifically, the power is higher at every PD parameter in H0.  
45 This limiting PD  vector  is in H0 and, therefore, should not be validated. It has a probability of 
validation equal to α.  
46 Note PDi → 0 ⇒ PDi → -∞ 
47 As the coordinates of the input to the power function cannot go to infinity as before, -c > -zα for the size 
to be achieved. 
48 See the definition of the critical region in the beginning of the section.   21 
of only the PD vectors with all but one of their coordinates PDis equal to their lower 
bounds (the postulated PDi-1s), and the remaining one, say PDj, set at uj, for j varying in 
1…I. More formally, 
 
Max 1≤j≤I (ΦI(-c + (u1 – PD0)/ (ρW /Y)
 ½ , ….,-c, …,-c + (uI – PDI-1)/ (ρW /Y)
 ½ ; ρB /ρW ) = α
49,50, 
from which the value of c can be derived. 
 
However, produced results indicate the previous modification approach is of 
limited efficacy to power improvement. More specifically, computed results indicate 
that the power increase is relevant only in the region of small (probably unrealistic) ratio 
ρB/ρW or for ambitious choices of ui (i.e. close to PDi). In the latter case, the increase is 
not sufficient, however, to the achievement of reasonable levels of power because the 
original levels are already too low (c.f. table 1 for example). Those results are consistent 
with the intuition derived from the analysis of tables 7 and 8. 
 
On the other hand, one may also try to derive the LRT based on the restricted 
PD parameter space: 
Ho: PDi ≥ ui for some i =1…I and PDi ≥ postulated PDi-1 for every I=1…I
51 
H1: PDi < ui for every i=1…I and PDi ≥ postulated PDi-1 for every I=1…I
52 
 
The LRT will differ from the modification approach with respect to the 
information contained in the observed default rates. The LRT will have very small 
observed average default rates providing lower relative evidence in favour of H1, 
because, by assumption, they cannot be explained by very small PDs
53. Accordingly, the 
null distribution of the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic doesn’t need to put mass on those 
unrealistic  PD scenarios. Unfortunately, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the 
derivation of the LRT critical region for such a problem is lacking in the statistical 
                                                     
49 PD0 is here just a lower bound to PD1. It could be -∞ or defined subjectively based on accumulated 
practical experience.  
50 Note that the new critical region will now depend on ρB and that the calculation of c needs some 
computational effort. 
51 Same observation about PD0 applies here as well. 
52 H1 need not be defined only by strict inequalities here since the union H0 U H1 does not span the full 
|R
I.   22 
literature. Its complexity arises from the facts that, in contrast to the original one-sided 
calibration test, H0 and H1 do not share the same boundary in |R
I and that the boundary 
indeed shared is a limited set. Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the null 
distribution of the LR statistic will be fairly complicated. And similarly to the previous 




4.b. Two-sided calibration testing 
 
The section now comments on two-sided calibration testing, mostly from a 
theoretical perspective. Similarly to the one-sided version, the hypotheses of a two-
sided test can be stated as follows. 
 
Ho: PDi ≥ ui or PDi ≤ li for some i =1.. I 
H1: li < PDi < ui for every i=1…I 
 
Now the acceptable indifference region is defined by two parameters ui and li for 
each rating i, with ideally li ≥ postulated PDi-1 and ui ≤ postulated PDi+1. Under that 
formulation, the test belongs to the class of multivariate equivalence tests, which are 
tests designed to show similarity rather than difference and are widely employed in the 
pharmaceutical industry to demonstrate that drugs are equivalent.
55 Berger and Hsu 
(1996) comprehensively review the recent development of equivalence tests in the 
univariate case (I=1). The standard procedure to test univariate equivalence is the TOST 
test (two one-sided tests - called this way because the procedure is equivalent to 
performing two size-α one sided tests and concluding equivalence only if both reject). 
Wang et.al. (1999) discuss the extension of TOST to the multivariate case, making use 
                                                                                                                                                          




54 It is important to remark that if I is large, strategies of power improvement will generally have more 
chances of relative success, although they depart from lower original levels of power. 
55 More specifically, those tests are referred as bioequivalent tests in the pharmaceutical industry.   23 
of the intersection-union method
56. When applied to the DRAPM distribution, that 
extension results in the following critical region for the two-sided calibration test
57. 
 
Reject Ho (i.e. validate the CRM) if  
li /(1- ρW )
½ + zα (ρW /(Y(1- ρW)))
 ½ ≤  i DR  ≤ ui /(1- ρW )
½ - zα (ρW /(Y(1- ρW)))
 ½ , 
for every i = 1…I 
 
As the maximum power of the test occurs in the middle point of the cube [li ui]
I, 
it is reasonable to make the cube symmetric around the postulated PD (in other words, 
to make ui - PDi = PDi - li for every i), so that the highest probability of validating the 
CRM occurs exactly at the postulated PD. Additional configurations of the indifference 
region may include, as in the one-sided test, choosing ui = PDi+1 or li=PDi-1 (but not 
both).  
 
Similarly to the one-sided test, the two-sided version has similar problems of 
lack of power and bias
58. In this respect, the statistical literature contains some 
proposals for improving TOST (Berger and Hsu(1996), Brown et. al.(1998)), which are 
again subject to criticism from an intuitive point of view by Perlman and Wu (1999)
59. 
Furthermore, an additional drawback of the two-sided test, in contrast to the original 
TOST, is its excess of conservatism because the test is only level α while its size may 
be much smaller.
60,61 That observation indicates the magnified difficulty in performing 
two-sided calibration testing.  
 
Yet, two additional approaches to testing multivariate equivalence deserve 
comments. The first one is developed by Brown et. al.(1995). Applied to the problem of 
                                                     
56 Wang et. al. (1999) also show that TOST is basically a LR test. 
57 The standard TOST is formulated assuming unknown variance while the proposed two-sided 
calibration test of this paper assumes known variance. Therefore the reference to the term TOST 
encompasses here some freedom of notation. 
58 If I>1, the test is not similar on the boundary between the hypotheses and therefore biased. 
59 However, in the case of calibration testing with known variance, the bias is not as pronounced as in the 
standard TOST with unknown variance due to the impossibility of making the variance go to 0 as in 
Berger and Hsu (1996). 
60 It can be shown that the degree of conservatism depends on ρB. 
61 The reason for the discrepancy with the standard TOST relates again to the impossibility of making the 
variance go to 0 as in Berger and Hsu (1996).   24 
PD calibration testing, it consists of accepting an alternative hypothesis H1 (i.e. 
validating the CRM) if the Brown confidence set for the PD vector is entirely contained 
in H1. The approach would allow the bank or the supervisor to separate the execution of 
the test from the task of defining an indifference region because H1 configuration could 
be discussed at a later stage, after the knowledge of the form of the set. In particular, the 
confidence set can be seen as the smallest indifference region that still permits to 
validate the calibration. Brown et.al. (1995) propose an optimal confidence set in the 
sense that, if the true PD vector is equal to the postulated one, then the expected volume 
of that set is minimal, which means that, in average terms, maximal precision is 
achieved when calibration is exactly right
62. The cost of this optimality is larger set 
volumes for PDs different from the postulated one. Munk and Pfluger (1999) show in 
simulation exercises that the power of Brown’s procedure can be substantially lower 
than those of more standard tests, like the TOST, for a wide range of PDs close to the 
postulated one. Therefore, in light of the view of this paper that ratings could more 
realistically be seen as PD intervals, the benefit of the optimality at a single point is 
doubtful at a minimum. Consequently, Brown’s approach is regarded here as of more 
theoretical than practical value to calibration testing.
63,64 
 
The second different approach to testing multivariate equivalence is developed 
by Munk and Pfluger (1999). So far, this paper has just considered rectangular sets in 
the H1 statements of the calibration tests. The goal has been to show that the true PD 
lies in a rectangle or in quadrant of the space |R
I. The referred authors analyze instead 
the use of ellipsoidal alternatives for the multivariate equivalence problem, which, for 
purposes of calibration testing, can be exemplified as follows. 
 
Ho: e
tDe ≥ Δ 
H1: e
tDe < Δ 
                                                     
62 The form of the set is not an ellipse, commonly found in multivariate analysis, but rather a figure 
known as the Limaçon of Pascal. 
63 Note also that DRAPM should be seen just an approximation to reality, so that, even if all borrowers in 
a rating have exactly the same PD, small deviations from the DRAPM assumptions may in practice 
distort the optimality at the true PD point. 
64 Other confidence set approaches to calibration testing are also possible. Some of them are, however, 
dominated by the multivariate TOST (Munk and Pflunger (1999)).   25 
where e = PD – postulated PD, D is a positive definite matrix, that conceives a 
notion of distance in |R
I,
 and Δ denotes a fixed tolerance bound. D and Δ define 
an indifference region for PD.  
 
Munk and Pfluger (1999) advocate this formulation to allow the notion of 
equivalence to be interpreted as a combined measure of several parameters (e.g. a 
combination of the PDis, i=1…I). As a consequence, this implies that very good 
marginal equivalence (e.g. the true PD1 is very close to the postulated PD1) should 
allow larger indifference regions for the other parameters (e.g. the other PDis). 
Conceptually though, this point is hard to justify in the validation of CRMs unless 
miscalibration were necessarily derived from a systematic erroneous estimation of all 
the PDis. Nevertheless, the view of this paper is that miscalibration could be rather 
rating specific. Furthermore, note that the rectangular alternatives already permit a lot of 
flexibility in allowing different indifference interval lengths for different ratings. 
Consequently, for purposes of calibration testing, ellipsoidal alternatives are regarded 




5. Tests of rating discriminatory power 
 
One of the most traditional measures of discriminatory power is the area under 
the ROC curve (AUROC)
66. Let n and m be two distinct random borrowers with 
probabilities of default PDn and PDm, respectively. Following Bamber(1975), AUROC 
is defined as: 
 
AUROC = Prob(PDn > PDm | n defaults and m doesn’t) + ½ Prob(PDn = PDm | n defaults and m 
doesn’t) 
 
                                                     
65 However, for purposes of power improvement, it might be still useful to investigate ellipsoidal 
alternatives inscribed or approximating rectangular alternatives. This investigation is not addressed at 
this paper. 
66 ROC = Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (c.f. Bamber (1975)). 0 ≤ AUROC ≤ 1.   26 
High values of AUROC (close to 1) are typically interpreted as evidence of good 
CRM discriminatory performance. However, the definition of AUROC as the 
probability of an event makes it a function not only of the PD vector but also of the 
default correlation structure
67. To the extent that the CRM should not be held 
accountable for the effect of default dependency between borrowers, the AUROC 
measure of discrimination becomes distorted.
68 The next proposition shows explicitly 
the dependency of AUROC on the asset correlation parameters. 
 
Proposition: Consider an extension of DRAPM in which (ρij) is the matrix of 
asset correlations between borrowers of ratings i and j, i,j =1…I. Let P(i,j) denote the 
probability of two random borrowers having ratings i and j and P(i) the probability of 
one random borrower having rating i. Then: 
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Proof: Appendix B. 
 
The remainder of this section describes alternative proposals of tests of rating 
discriminatory power built upon the DRAPM distribution. The qualifying term rating is 
added purposefully to the traditional expression “discriminatory power” to emphasize 
that the property desired to be concluded/measured here is different from that embedded 
in traditional measures of discriminatory power. Rather than verifying that the ex-post 
rating distributions of the default and non-default groups of borrowers are as separate as 
possible, the proposed tests of rating discriminatory power aim at showing that PDi is a 
strictly increasing function of i. In other words, the discriminatory power should be 
present at the rating level or, more concretely, low quality ratings should have larger 
PDis. Note that this is a less stringent requirement than correct two-sided calibration and 
the alternative hypothesis here will, therefore, strictly contain the H1 of the two-sided 
                                                     
67 It is a function of the distribution of borrowers along the ratings too. 
68 Note that, in the contrast, the definition of good calibration is always purely linked to the good quality 
of the PD vector, although the way to empirically conclude that will typically depend on the default 
correlation values, as shown in section 4.   27 
calibration test
69. In this sense, the fulfilment of good rating discriminatory power is 
consistent with the pursuit of correct calibration. Furthermore, as the proposed tests are 
based on hypotheses involving solely the PD vector, they are not function of default 
correlations; consequently they address the two pitfalls of traditional measures of 
discriminatory power that were discussed in the introduction. Finally, showing PD 
monotonicity along the rating dimension is also useful to corroborate the assumptions of 
some methods of PD inference on low default portfolios (e.g. Pluto & Tasche (2005)). 
 
This section distinguishes between a test of general rating discriminatory power 
and a test of focal rating discriminatory power. The former addresses a situation where 
the bank or supervisor is uncertain about the increasing PD behaviour along the whole 
rating scale whereas the latter focuses on a pair of consecutive ratings. 
 
The formulation of the general test is proposed below. 
Ho: PDi ≥ PDi+1 for some i =1…I-1 
H1: PDi < PDi+1 for every i=1…I-1 
 
By viewing PDi+1 - PDi as the unknown parameter to be estimated (up to a 
constant) by DRi+1 - DRi for every rating i, the previous test involves testing strict 
homogeneous inequalities about normal means
70. So, similarly to the one-sided 
calibration test, a size-α likelihood-ratio critical region can be derived. 
 
Reject H0 (i.e. validate the CRM) if 
i i DR DR − +1 > zα (2(ρW-ρB)/(Y(1- ρW)))
 ½ for every i = 1…I-1 
 
It is worth noting above that, differently from the calibration tests, there is no 
need to the configuration of an indifference region, as the desired H1 conclusion is 
already defined by strict inequalities. On the other hand, now the critical region and, 
therefore, the decision itself to validate the CRM depends on the unknown parameter 
                                                     
69 Provided ui < li+1 for i=1…I-1, as expected in practical applications. 
70 The key observable variables are now default rate differences between consecutive ratings, rather than 
the default rates themselves, as in the one-sided calibration test.   28 
ρB. The Basel II case (ρB =ρW) represents the extreme liberal situation where just an 
observed increasing behaviour of the average annual default rates along the rating 
dimension is sufficient to validate the CRM (regardless of the confidence level α) 
whereas the case ρB =0 places the strongest requirement in the incremental increase of 
the default rate averages along the rating scale
71. In practical situations, the bank or the 
supervisor may want to determine the highest value of ρB such that the general test still 
validates the CRM and then check how this value conforms to its beliefs about reality. 
 
When theoretically compared to the power of the one-sided calibration test, the 
power of the general test is notably affected by a trade-off of three factors
72. First, the 
fact that now the underlying normal variables are likely to have smaller variances 
(Var(DRi+1-DRi)=2(ρW-ρB)/(1-  ρW) < Var(DRi)=ρW/(1-  ρW), provided ρB/ρW  > 1/2) 
contributes to an increase in power. On the other hand, the now not positive underlying 
correlations ( Corr(DRi+1-DRi, DRj-DRj-1)= -1/2 if i=j and 0 otherwise, compared to 
Corr(DRi,DRj)=ρB/ρW > 0 for i≠j ) contributes to a decrease in power
73. Finally, the 
presence of I-1 statements in H1, instead of I, implies a slight increase in power too In 
general, the resulting dominating force is to be determined by the particular choices of 
ρB, ρW and I. However, computed results indicate discrimination test power will usually 
be larger than calibration power for CRM designs including both arithmetic and 
geometric progressions for the PDis and reasonable specifications for the testing 
parameters
74. Finally, likewise calibration testing, similar comments on possible 
strategies for power improvement and their limitations apply here as well.  
 
It is also worthwhile to discuss the situation where the bank or the supervisor is 
satisfied by the “general level” of rating discrimination except for a particular pair of 
consecutive ratings. Suppose the bank/supervisor wants to find evidence that two 
                                                     
71 This is again intuitive as low values of ρB mean that ex-post information about one rating does not 
contain much information about other ratings. 
72 Similarly to the calibration case, the power expression can be easily derived. 
73 Therefore, not necessarily validating rating discriminatory power is easier than validating (one-sided) 
calibration. 
74 Also, computed results in line with previous calibration findings, indicate CRMs whose PDis follow 
geometric progression will generally achieve higher levels of power than when PDis follow arithmetic 
progression and their power are basically driven by the first pairs of consecutive ratings, in the high 
credit quality part of the scale.    29 
consecutive ratings (say ratings 1 and 2, without loss of generality) indeed distinguish 
the borrowers in terms of their creditworthiness. From a supervisory standpoint, a 
suspicion of regulatory arbitrage may for instance motivate the concern.
75 To examine 
this issue, this section formulates a test of focal rating discriminatory power, whose 
hypotheses are stated as follows.
76 
 
Ho: PD1 = PD2 ≤ PD3 ≤….≤ PDI  
H1: PD1 < PD2 ≤ PD3 ≤….≤ PDI 
 
From a mathematical point of view, the development of the likelihood ratio test 
for such a problem is more complex than the majority of the tests considered so far in 
this paper, because now the union of the null and the alternative hypotheses do not span 
the full |R
I neither the hypotheses share a common boundary. But, in contrast to the 
section 4 one-sided calibration LRT under PD restriction, now both H0 and H1 are 
convex cones. This implies that the null distribution of the LR will depend on the 
structure of the cone C = Ho U H1, whether obtuse or acute with respect to norm 
induced by ∑
-1.
 77,78 In the first case, the LR statistic follows a χ2 bar distribution under 
H0 (Menendez et. al. (1992a)).
79 In the second case, the distribution of the LR statistic is 
intractable but the test is dominated in power by a reduced test comprised of testing just 
the  different parts of the hypotheses Ho  and H1 (Menendez and Salvador (1991), 
Menendez et. al. (1992b)). It can be shown that the structure of ∑ adopted in this paper 
makes the cone C acute, so that the second case is the relevant one.
80 The reduced 
dominating test takes the form ahead. 
                                                     
75 Suspicion of regulatory arbitrage may derive from a situation where large credit risk exposures are 
apparently rated with slightly better ratings so that the resulting capital charge of Basel II is 
diminished. 
76 The discussion of this section is easily generalized to the situation where more than one pair of 
consecutive ratings are to have their rating discriminatory power verified. 
77 See (reference) for the definitions of those cone types. 




Σ Σ = −  
79 Although χ2 bar distributions are common in the theory of order-restricted inference (Robertson et. al. 
(1988)), application of the focal test in this circumstance is not very practical as the determination of both 
the LRT statistic and the p-values are computer intensive. 
80 This is true because ai’Σaj ≤ 0, i≠j, where the ai’s (ai = (0,…,-1,1,…,0)’ ) generate the linear restrictions 
defining the cone C. More specifically, it is true that ai’Σaj = (ρB - ρW)/(1 - ρW) if |i-j| = 1 or 0 if |i-j| ≥ 2. 
See the mentioned references for further details. May more general but still realistic variance structures Σ 
lead to a different conclusion is an interesting question not addressed in this paper.   30 
Ho: PD1 = PD2  
H1: PD1 < PD2  
 
The test above is just a particular case of the general rating discriminatory power test 
with I=2. Accordingly, its rejection rule is given as follows. 
 
Reject H0 (i.e. validate the CRM) 
 if  1 2 DR DR − > zα (2(ρW-ρB)/(Y(1- ρW)))
 ½  
 
The dominance of the focal test by a reduced test is a surprising result and was 
long considered an anomaly of the LR principle (see e.g. Warrack and Robertson 
(1984)). In the context of CRMs this means that, in order to judge the discriminatory 
performance of a particular pair of consecutive ratings, the bank or the supervisor would 
be in a better position if it simply disregards the prior knowledge of the performance of 
the other ratings. But how can less information be better? Only most recently Perlman 
and Wu (1999) showed that indeed the overall picture was not so much in favour of the 
“dominating” test, arguing that the latter presents controversial properties. For example, 
it rejects PDs closer to H0 than to H1
81. Nevertheless, the practitioner does not have 
another choice besides using the power dominating test, because, as just observed, the 
null distribution of the LRT statistic for the focal test is unknown. Having that in mind, 
the analysis of this section provides the theoretical foundation to an easy-to-implement 
procedure that focuses solely on the supposedly problematic pair of ratings. More 
interestingly however, a generalization of the results discussed in this section suggests a 
uniform procedure to check rating discriminatory power: select the ratings whose 
discriminatory capacity are at stake and apply the general test to them. 
 
                                                     
81 Perlman and Wu (1999) conclude once again that UMP size-α tests should not be pursued at any cost.   31 
6. Small sample properties 
 
All the tests discussed in this paper are based on the asymptotic distribution of 
DRAPM, which assumes an infinite number of borrowers for each rating. This section 
analyses the implications to the performance of the one-sided calibration test of a finite 
but still large number of borrowers (N=100 is chosen as the base case)
82. Due to the 
strong reliance of the test on the asymptotic normality of the marginal distributions of 
DRAPM, it is important to verify how the real marginals compare to the asymptotic 
ones
83. The focus on a particular marginal allows then, for the sake of clarity, to restrict 
the attention to the case I=1
84. Hence this section conducts Monte-Carlo simulations of 
DRAPM, at the stage in which idiosyncratic risk is not yet diversified away
85 and for 
I=1, N=100 and Y=5, unless stated otherwise. Based on a large set of simulated average 
annual default rates, the effective significance level is computed as a function of the 
























r P ˆ   level   confidence   Effective  
where the probability is estimated by the empirical frequency of the event and 
DR denotes a particular simulation result. 
 
The effective level measures the real size of the asymptotic size-α one-sided test. 
Alternatively, since it is expressed in the form of a probability of rejection, the effective 
level can also be seen as the real power at the postulated PD, when the asymptotic 
power is equal to α, of an asymptotic size δ one-sided test, with δ < α
87. From both 
interpretations, the occurrence of effective levels lower than nominal levels means that 
                                                     
82 The analysis is restricted to the one-sided calibration test not only because it is the main focus of this 
paper but also because the small sample properties of discriminatory tests are more complex to 
analyse as distributions of default rate differences are involved. Also, as perceived later in the section, 
the issues of most concern related to the small-sample properties of the two-sided calibration test 
derive from the analysis of the one-sided case. 
83 Review the form of the critical region in section 4. 
84 The issue of how the normal copula is distorted by the reality of a finite number of borrowers is not 
addressed in this version of the paper. 
85 In other words, before N → ∞. 
86 In general 200000 simulations are run for each scenario. 
87 More specifically, it is easy to see that δ = Φ(-zα - (u – PD)/(ρW/Y )
½)   32 
the test is more conservative, with a smaller probability of validation in general than 
what is suggested by the analysis of section 4 based on DRAPM. Effective levels higher 
than nominal levels indicates the opposite: a small sample liberal bias. 
 
A general important finding derived from the performed simulations is that the 
convergence of the lower tails of the (transformed) average default rate distributions to 
their normal asymptotic limits is slower and less smooth than in the case of the upper 
tails, for realistic PD values of
88. The situation is illustrated by the following pair of 
graphs calculated based on the scenario PD=3%, ρW=0.20, N=100 and Y=5. The blue 
line represents the effective confidence level for each nominal level depicted at the x-
axes while the green line is the identity function merely denoting the nominal level to 
facilitate comparison. Note that the effective level is much farther from the nominal 
value in the lower tail of the distribution (depicted on the right-hand graph) than in the 
upper tail (depicted on the left-hand graph). In particular, if the one-sided calibration 
test is employed at the nominal level of 10%, the test will be much more conservative in 
reality, as the effective size will be approximately only 4%
89. 
 
Graph 1: Lower and upper tails,  
PD=3%, ρW=0.20 N=100,Y=5 
 
 
Indeed, the fact that the lower tail is less well behaved is strongly relevant to this 
paper’s one-sided calibration test. Under the approach of placing the undesired 
conclusion in H0 (e.g. PD ≥ u), rejection of the null, or equivalently validation, is 
obtained if average default rates are small, so that the one-sided test is based in fact on 
                                                     
88 The intuitive reason for this being that Φ
-1(PD) → -∞ when PD → 0. 
89 There is less mass in the simulated lower tail than in the respective tail of the DRAPM distribution.   33 
the lower tail of the distribution. On the contrary, the upper tail would be the relevant 
part of the distribution had the approach of placing the “CRM correctly specified” 
hypothesis in H0 been adopted, as in BCBS(2005b). Since convergence of the upper tail 
is better behaved, the small sample departure from the normal limit would be smaller in 




The main numerical findings regarding the small sample power performance of 
the one-sided calibration test are described in the sequence, based on the analysis of the 
simulated lower tails. The investigation starts with the effect of the true PD on the 
effective confidence level. Graphs 2 and 3 reveal that, in the region of 0%<PD<10% 
and 0.15<ρW<0.20, as PD increases, the test evolves from having a conservative bias 
(true power smaller than the asymptotic one) to having a liberal bias (true power larger 
than the asymptotic one). At PD=4% for ρW = 0.20 or at PD=3% for ρW = 0.15 the 
small sample bias is approximately null as the test matches its theoretical limiting 
values. On the other hand, in the region of 10%<PD<15% and 0.15<ρW<0.20, as PD 
increases, the blue line comes back a bit closer to the green one, i.e. the test diminishes 
its liberal bias (but not sufficiently so as to turn conservative). 
 
Graph 2: Effect of PD, 
ρW=0.20 N=100,Y=5 
 
                                                     
90 Because the worse relative behaviour of the lower tail would not be revealed.   34 
Graph 3: Effect of PD, 
ρW=0.15, N=100,Y=5 
 
As the asymptotic one-sided test based on DRAPM already suffers from 
problems of lack of power, this section suggests, as possible general recommendation, 
to consider real (unmodified) applications of the test solely in the cases where the small 
sample analysis indicates a non-conservative bias. Indeed, if instead an additional layer 
of conservatism is added to the already conservative asymptotic test, the resulting 
procedure test may hardly validate at all. The restriction to the small sample liberal 
cases rules out, for example, according to graphs 2 and 3, validation of low PDs (e.g. 
PD ≤ 3%). Consequently, a possible practical advice is to apply the test only to the 
remainder of the postulated PD vector (e.g. ratings 3 to 7 in the example related to table 
1). Alternatively, a higher nominal level α could be applied to the low PDs. 
 
The influence of correlation and the number of years under the base case of 
N=100 are analyzed in graphs 4 and 5. As the within-rating asset correlation ρW 
increases, the test evolves from a liberal bias to a small conservative one. Note that this 
represents a second channel, now through the small sample properties, by which ρW 
diminishes the power of the test. The effect of an increase in the number of years, in the 
region of 1 to 10 years, is to smooth considerably the distribution lower tail, although 
the direction of convergence is not clearly established. Results not shown also indicate 
that as N increases beyond 100, the blue and green lines come closer at every graph, as 
expected. 
   35 
Graph 4: Effect of ρW  
P PD D= =5 5% %, Y=5, N=100 
 
Graph 5: Effect of Y 
PD=5%, ρW=0.20 N=100 
 
Finally it is important to observe that, even if the one-sided test could be totally 
based on the simulated distributions of this section, there would still be some extreme 
cases where validation is virtually impossible at traditional low confidence levels. When 
Y=1 (c.f. graph 6) or true PD=1%, for example, the lower tail of distribution is quite 
discrete and presents significant probability of zero defaults. As a result, the effective 
confidence level jumps several times and assumes only a small finite number of values 
in the lower tail. When Y=1 the first non-zero effective level is already approximately 
15%; after that, the next value is approximately 30%. Therefore, validation at 5% or 
10% significance level is not possible. Hence, Basel II prescription of a minimum of 5 
years of data is important not only to increase the asymptotic power of the test, 
according to section 4, but also to remove the quite problematic small sample behaviour 
of the lower tail.  
   36 
7. Conclusion 
 
This study contributes to the CRM validation literature in introducing new ways 
to statistically address the validation  of credit rating PDs. Firstly, it proposes new 
formulations for H0 and H1 in order to control the error of accepting an incorrect CRM. 
Secondly, it provides an integrated treatment of all ratings at once, in a way that 
recognizes the effect of default correlation. Finally, it provides a unified framework for 
testing calibration and rating discriminatory power. All these aspects are interlinked 
with the development of a probabilistic asymptotic normal model for the average default 
rate vector that recognizes default correlation. Important empirical and practical 
consequences stem from these proposals as outlined in the following paragraphs. 
 
On calibration testing, the relative roles played by the distinct elements that 
affect the power are unveiled for the one-sided version. The feature of increasing PD 
differences between consecutive ratings, found in many real-world CRMs, and, 
particularly, the choice of liberal indifference regions are shown to be important to the 
achievement of reasonable levels of power. On the other hand, the correlation between 
the ratings, whose calibration is not present in Basel II, possesses only a minor effect on 
power. Also, appropriately restricting the set of PDs to be tested may do a job almost as 
good as the original test in terms of power, which may offer support, in many practical 
circumstances, to reduce joint validation of credit rating PDs to individual validation of 
a few rating PDs. Another important general message of the analysis is that the power of 
the one-sided calibration test is unavoidably and substantially low in some cases. 
Regarding this issue, strategies of power improvement are discussed, suggesting limited 
efficacy or inappropriateness. Additionally, the paper discusses the conceptual problems 
of applying modern ideas in multivariate equivalence to two-sided calibration testing.  
 
As far as discrimination is concerned, a new goal of rating discriminatory power 
is established for CRMs. In contrast to traditional measures of discrimination, the new 
aimed property is less stringent than the requirement of perfect calibration and is not 
dependent on default correlation. Results of uniform power dominance provide a 
theoretical foundation for restricting the investigation of the desired property just to the 
pairs of consecutive ratings whose discriminatory capacity are at stake and, therefore, 
lead to an easy-to-implement procedure.   37 
Understanding the implications of DRAPM to validation also includes an 
analysis of its small sample properties. As a matter of fact, DRAPM has the 
disadvantage of being an asymptotic model whose small sample properties may 
introduce a significant additional layer of test conservatism besides the asymptotic one. 
Monte Carlo simulations show that this will likely be the case for small PDs (e.g. PD ≤ 
3%) or small number of years (e.g. Y ≤ 5) in the one-sided calibration test. A possible 
recommendation is to rule out real (unmodified) applications of that test in those cases. 
On the other hand, when a liberal small sample bias is present, it may counterbalance 
the nominal conservatism, although some caution should always be exercised in the 
analysis. A general more robust procedure, however, would ideally try to incorporate 
the remaining non-systemic part of the credit risk into the validation process. Future 
research is warranted on this aspect.  
 
Above all, the bank or the regulator should not demand much from statistical 
testing of CRMs. Even under the simplifying assumptions of DRAPM, the power of the 
tests of this paper, as well as other tests discussed in the literature, is negatively affected 
by the unavoidable presence of default correlation and by the small length of default 
rate time series available in banks’ databases. Possibly due to this reason, BCBS(2005b) 
perceives validation as comprising not only quantitative but also somewhat qualitative 
tools. It is likely, for example, that the investigation of the continuous internal use of 
PDs/ratings by the bank may uncover further evidence, although subjective, supporting 
or not the CRM validation. Nonetheless, this paper supports the view that the possibility 
of reliance on qualitative aspects opened by the Basel Committee should not dampen 
the incentives to extract as much quantitative feedback as possible from statistical 





The figure below should be interpreted as a result over the long run and displays 
a rating model with perfect discrimination but not perfect calibration. The bars’ heights 
represent the magnitude of the ex-post default rate for each rating. All borrowers 
classified as C to E defaulted whereas all borrowers classified as A to B survived. If this 
is the regular behaviour of this CRM, knowing beforehand the rating of the obligor 
allows one to predict default or not default with certainty (perfect discriminatory 
power). The red line indicates the ex-ante PD estimate for each rating. Ratings A and B 
had 0% default rate, thus lower than the ex-ante prediction. Ratings C to E had 100% 
default rate, thus higher than the ex-ante prediction. The CRM is therefore not correctly 
calibrated. Obviously this example represents an extreme case (because realistic CRMs 
don’t have perfect discriminatory power) but it is useful to illustrate that, although both 
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Appendix B 
 
Proof of proposition. 
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where the last equality derives from the expression for a joint probability of default and 
non-default implicit in a DRAPM style model (c.f. Gordy(2000)). Similarly, the second 
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